Abstract: This paper explores the origins of Andorra's financial cluster. It shows that the free movement of currency, the protection of infant industry, and geographical concentration lie at the foundation of the cluster's competitive advantage. Drawing on a new set of data, the paper also provides for the first time an estimate of the total deposits held by Andorra's banks between 1931 and 2007. Based on this new information, the paper reaches the conclusion that the development of the cluster went through four distinct phases in which large companies, acting as leaders, played an important role in enhancing the cluster's business capabilities.
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its volume of deposits is not included. Even so, it is known that its funds had risen to 39.68 million pesetas by the end of 1959 (Nadal and Sudrià 1981, p.380) .
To calculate the estimate, it is assumed that banks, in any years without available data, achieved a growth in deposits equivalent to the average growth of all firms included in the calculation of the aggregate. This may not be the most reasonable criterion at an individual level, but it does provide valuable information on the general trend in the sector. In addition, most banks were set up as foreign exchange businesses.
As no assurances can be given that they accepted deposits, the assumption is made that banks began to receive deposits in the year that they obtained their license. To adjust the data set for inflation, the estimation uses the Spanish consumer price index put forward by Carreras and Tafunell (2004) .
Figure 1 Estimation of Andorra's bank deposits 1931-2007 (in 1950 pesetas)
Source: Own preparation. Historically, Andorra has not had its own currency.
2 Throughout the twentieth century, the French franc and the Spanish peseta were both used in the country, although the peseta was more widespread. The budgets of the General Council were prepared in pesetas, most salaries were paid in pesetas and bank deposit data were reported in pesetas. Adjusting the data in the two currencies for inflation provides evidence of similar trends in the evolution of deposits. In figure 1, four stages can be identified in the lifecycle of the cluster. 3 Between 1931 and 1947 deposits grew at a rapid, but erratic pace. Between 1947 and , the pace of new deposits slackened significantly compared to the previous period. From 1957 From until 1982 , the sector saw a sustained period of hypergrowth. Lastly, from 1982 to the end of the data set, the growth in deposits lost steam and became more modest, experiencing alternating positive and negative growth rates. By estimating deposits, it is possible to analyse the role played by the various banks in the configuration of the cluster. On the whole, scholars of industrial organization draw the conclusion that the geographical concentration of companies in districts or clusters fosters the appearance of competitive advantages. However, they hold opposing views regarding company size in the creation of competitive advantage.
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Proponents of small-scale business take inspiration from the development of neoMarshallian districts in the so-called Terza Italia, or Third Italy. They stress that a large number of small firms makes the Marshallian district highly dynamic and flexible, better able to adapt to demand and to manage the use of the workforce. They argue that the drawbacks of a small scale are outweighed by the value of cooperation when creating business networks and purchasing inputs jointly (Becattini 1979 , Brusco 1982 , Sforzi 2009 ). On the other side, some authors see a source of competitive advantage in the capabilities of large companies (Chandler 1987 , Landes 1988 , Markusen 1996 .
They underscore that the successes of the US and Germany during the Second Industrial Revolution exploited economies of scale generated by clusters in which large businesses were predominant. Along the same lines, tertiary clusters such as the high-tech industry Together with economies of scale, it seems clear that strategy, organizational learning, management capability and process improvement make the large company a major source of internal economies.
In the case of Andorran banking, the estimation of deposits points to a clear hierarchy among the firms in the cluster (Table 2 ). Between 1957, the year in which the opening of new firms was prohibited, and 2007, the two banks with the greatest market share accounted for over 60 per cent of deposits. The advantages stemming from banking concentration in Andorra were reinforced by the existence of large firms that acted as leaders in contributing to the improved business capabilities of the cluster.
III. Origins of the Cluster, 1930-47
In 1930, Andorra ended the licensing policy that had been in force since the midnineteenth century. 4 During this period, the country had sought to modernize a predominantly rural economic structure by granting licenses for gaming, thermal springs and postal services. With the advent of the twentieth century, concessions for the exploitation of natural resources were proposed. After a score of failed projects, the co-princes pushed forward a hydroelectric power station (Lluelles 2004, p. 35 (Turró 2007, p. 53) . Smuggling rose sharply. Andorra, as a country bordering both France and Spain, benefited economically from its geographical location, introducing all kinds of products to its two neighbours, particularly tobacco, hides, wool and automotive parts (Lluelles 1991, p. 253 ).
Andorra's neutrality also made it a safe haven for currencies. The demand of refugees ! "+! from the Spanish civil war for French francs fuelled currency exchange in the country.
World War II, the high post-war inflation of the franc and the appearance of parallel market rates for the peseta and the franc also appear to have played a role in the influx of capital into Andorra. 8 The evolution of deposits makes it possible to approximate the monetary impact of the Spanish and global conflicts. Although the data are not continuous in these early years, deposits grew between 1931 and 1947 at a real cumulative annual rate of 24.9 per cent. To that end, the General Council passed laws against speculation so as to prevent harm to the domestic economy. Foreigners were prohibited from any unauthorized purchase or sale of currency and all payments were required to be made in pesetas. 9 Despite the constraints, however, the prospects offered by foreign exchange encouraged some Andorrans to take up the currency business. In the nineteen-thirties and forties, at least six cases can be identified. (Gurdó 2002, p. 15) .
The Spanish civil war and World War II were a historic shock for Andorra's economy. The country acted as a safe haven for currencies amid surrounding monetary instability. With the end of the conflicts, the country's introduction into global trade and the regulation of goods moving through France and Spain enabled the country to benefit from international imports arriving from two directions. This reflected the post-war complementarity of needs in Andorra's two neighbouring markets which, together with the absence of excise taxes, helped to give rise to a powerful trade and tourism sector aimed at French and Spanish consumers (Bricall et al. 1975 , Lluelles 1991 In light of these considerations, the General Council acted on 20 July 1951 to repeal any earlier provision on the subject of banking and went on to establish the requirements that had to be met by any firms wishing to enter banking or foreign exchange. Among the key points to underscore were the disbursement of a million ! "%! pesetas or the sum's equivalent in French francs at the time of founding, and the requirement that all capital must belong to Andorran citizens. 16 Later foreign stakes were restricted to a third of any company or bank's share capital. 17 This policy, which was strongly protectionist in nature and analogous to the regulation of limited companies in 1940, was motivated by a strategy aimed at infant industry protection in the face of international competition (Chang 2004, p. 49-133.; 2012, p. 87-98 Between 1947 and 1957 the resources of third parties in Andorra's banks grew, on average, by 9.8 per cent annually in real terms. Despite the fact that the benefits from neutrality had evaporated, the banking sector expanded its critical mass throughout the period. The creation of new banks was sparked by opportunities to exploit the revealed competitive advantage arising out of the non-convertibility of European currencies. In particular, one of the chief factors behind the emergence of banking in Andorra was the distorted monetary policy of the early Franco regime (Viñas 1979, p. 268-81; Catalan 1993, p. 121; 1995, p.117; 2003, p. 139; Serrano and Asensio 1997, p.549) . One ! "'! downside of the Franco regime's policy was that it encouraged capital flight amid the high inflation assailing Spain. It also entailed the financing of imports from abroad thanks to the availability of foreign currency (Cabana 2005, p. 67; Viñas 1979, p. 802) .
The destabilization of the Spanish balance of payments and the collapse of the peseta's rate of exchange in the free market of Tangier from 1956 onwards produced an immediate effect: pesetas were transferred to Andorra to be exchanged for other currencies (Viñas 1979, p. 825) . 26 The concentration of new banks created that year, their ties to Tangier, and the takeoff in deposits from that date onwards support this view (IMF Country Report 2007, p. 9).
The entrepreneurial bent that characterizes this period is a result of economic activities fostered during the critical period of the Spanish civil war and World War II.
Wartime currency exchange, tobacco and livestock exports, and post-war trade generated the original accumulation that permitted the creation of Andorra's banks. In order to exploit the opportunities in the environment, the new fortunes in the country forced competition into the sector. The profits gained from neutrality were sunk into the creation of a financial cluster that drew on competitive advantage from currency exchange. The strategy in favour of infant industry protection and the prohibition against granting authorization to new banks were crucial policies for the formation of a sector protected from foreign competition and dominated by local firms.
V. The Boom, 1957-82
The creation of the cluster shook up the sector and attracted foreign banks. In 1960 the cluster's main institution was set up: the Association of Andorran Banks. The association brought all local banks together in order to institute self-regulation, defend (Eichengreen 1996, p. 163; 2007, p. 84) . Because Andorra did not have its own currency, it remained on the regulatory fringes. The ability of Andorra's banks to hold accounts in foreign currencies acted as an incentive for inflows of speculative capital. 27 Banking secrecy and the absence of taxes meant a lack of cooperation with neighbouring countries. This state of affairs essentially made Andorra an offshore haven for foreign capital. This is the context in which devaluation of the peseta undertaken as part of Spain's Stabilization Plan of 1959 precipitated Spain's ! ")! nine-month closure of the border with Andorra. The argument was that Andorra possessed speculators who had previously been established in Tangier (Giral 1988, p. 33 ). Despite measures adopted by the General Council so as not to undermine the currencies of neighbouring countries, the wealth of third parties held in Andorra's banks that year rose by 11.5 per cent in real terms with respect to the previous year.
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Andorra's banking model, once the domestic demand for credit had been met, was based on attracting French francs and Spanish pesetas which were then converted into foreign currencies because of inflation or the risk of devaluation and put into fixedincome securities and deposits in correspondent banks abroad. Internally, they held short-term positions in pesetas and francs to finance the country's trade flows. This enabled them to avoid working with the Spanish or French interbank. As a consequence, however, the scarcity of pesetas or francs sometimes gave rise to lending in foreign currencies (Arasanz 1986 
Figure 2 Spanish and French tourists visiting Andorra, 1961-89
Source: (Bricall et al. 1975 and Lluelles 1991) (Lluelles 1991, p. 439) . These would have been purchased by Siaguins, a subsidiary of the Spanish central bank whose mission was to support the parity of the peseta abroad. 31 In 1979 the second oil price shock aggravated the European situation and sent inflation soaring. In the Spanish case, the excessive gradualism adopted with respect to the process of substitution and energy savings prolonged the effects of the oil price shock into the mid-eighties (Rojo 1994, p.196) . High rates of inflation and the devaluation of the peseta in 1982 and of the franc in the early eighties once again spurred the movement of capital to Andorra.
VI. Maturity, 1982-2007
In the nineteen-eighties, the growth of deposits in Andorra's banks eased back significantly with respect to previous periods. The chief causes of this trend can be found in the gradual liberalization of capital controls after the collapse of Bretton Woods, the gradual process of European integration and the growing monetary stability 
1 Andorra is a small landlocked country in the Pyrenees that has been governed since 1288 by two coprinces, the Bishop of Urgell and the Count of Foix (whose role was later transferred to the President of France). Andorra's first parliament was created in 1419. Known as the Consell de la Terra, it was later reformed and renamed the General Council. In 1993, the country approved a constitution that established an effective separation of executive, legislative and judicial powers in the context of a sovereign state with the two co-princes serving as joint heads of state.
2 Andorra does not have its own currency mainly because its domestic market is small. The country's limited size has fostered intense trade flows with neighbouring countries and encouraged the use of their currencies, which it has adopted as its own.
3 While Klepper (1997) , Maggioni (2005) and Maskell and Kebir (2005) identify three stages in the lifecycle of clusters, the evidence of this study points to four distinct stages, in line with Tichy (1998), Swann (2002) , Bergman (2006) and Menzel and Fornahl (2007) . For a thorough overview of the lifecycle of clusters, see Bergman (2008) . (Cabana 1996, p. 178-82) .
6 Decree of exclusive banking rights enacted on 18 April 1929 (AGCA). 26 For more information on the peseta's rate of exchange in Tangier, see Pick (1957, p. 269) . My thanks go to Dr. Jordi Catalan for generously alerting me to this source. 27 The most common foreign currencies used when opening an account in the principality, according to information provided by professionals in the sector, were the US dollar, the British pound, the German mark, the Swiss franc and the Swedish krona. Sogues (1975, p. 322) estimates that the relative weight of foreign currency balances in Andorra in 1975 exceeded 65%. Arasanz (1986, p. 95) notes that by 1982 foreign currency balances in the main Andorran banks were in the region of 80%.
28 Notice of 21 April 1959 establishing that: 1. Payment for goods not intended for import were forbidden; 2. Opening bank accounts for non-residents was forbidden; 3. Shareholders and shares in banks had to be submitted formally in writing, and 4. Inspectors were appointed by the General Council (Fiter 1973, p.442) . Muñoz into exile in Switzerland in order to avoid being incarcerated in Spain (Cabana 1996, p.186-90) . 30 Letter of the chief magistrates to the General Council on 17 November 1970, record number 1256-se (AGCA). 31 Siaguins dates back to an office set up by the Spanish central bank in the nineteen-forties in Rue des
Siaghins in Tangier. The aim of the office was to intervene in the black market for pesetas. With the peseta's foreign convertibility in 1959, the Sociedad Siaguins was created as a subsidiary of the Spanish central bank and the Tangier office moved to Zurich. The objectives of the subsidiary were to sell pesetas to anyone requesting them, thereby avoiding scarcity and pushing the exchange rate higher, and to buy any pesetas offered on the international market asking no questions about their place of origin, thereby !
